Abstract
Introduction
Human motion analysis is important topic in computer vision. In many cases people and their There are approaches to activity recognition that do not rely on tracking or motion estima- proposed a general framework to learn and recognize sequential image data in low-dimensional 91 embedding space. To find more compact representations of high dimensional image data, they 92 adopted locality preserving projections (LPP) to achieve the low-dimensional embedding of dy-93 namic silhouette data. previously seen action, action recognition was achieved.
100
In this paper, we demonstrate our approach on the task of identifying people by their motion 101 when they approach access control point. Similarly to the gait-based recognition, this task is 102 helped by narrowing down the context of human motion. In our case, people have to perform 103 certain tasks (showing the keycard to the keycard reader and placing a finger on the finger-104 print scanner), to gain access. This way, motion is essentially "normalized" to few standard 105 gestures, which provides means for person identification and for detection of unusual behavior.
106
Our approach was designed with practical applications in mind, therefore we placed high im- placing a finger on a reader, opening of a door), there exist many subtle and less subtle differences 114 in how these tasks are performed. For example, some people carry their cards in the wallets, other 115 in their pockets or purses. Some are left-handed, others are right-handed. Some will come to the 116 access point with the keycard already prepared, others will reach for it in the last moment before 117 authentication. Finally, some will grasp the card with the same hand they use for providing a 118 fingerprint, and others will use both hands. Some people will participate in particular behavior, 119 known as tailgating, where one person opens the door, and more persons enter -this is in many 120 cases a violation of access rules and had to be detected as unusual behavior.
121
To capture those differences between different individuals, and to detect unusual behavior, we 122 developed a method of motion feature extraction, which had to satisfy multiple constraints.
123
First, to be used in surveillance application, the method of extraction motion features has to 124 be insensitive to lighting, clothing and other circumstances that are beyond our control. This 125 directed the research towards extracting a motion using optical flow, without limiting ourselves 126 to particular implementation of optical flow calculation.
127
Second, the compact motion representation was needed, for the method to have any chances 128 of ever being used in real world applications, where features of many individuals might be stored 129 in a compact (embedded) device, such as future generations of access point controllers.
130
Third, the algorithm has to be reasonably fast, to have potential to be used in embedded 131 system without excessive computational power. The computational demands for optical flow 132 calculations are usually high, however, as we will show in the paper, we managed to use MPEG4 133 compressed streams to obtain motion vectors and therefore bypass the optical flow calculation 134 completely, with good results.
135
Our approach is based on several assumptions, as follows: keycards, iris scanners, just to name a few).
140
-Existing security policy. We do assume that there are certain rules of behavior that users must 141 adhere to. The task of such a system would be to detect and report the behavior that deviates 142 from the usual activity.
-Repetitive user behavior. In our preliminary tests, we discovered that after a few weeks of 144 using the access control system, people tend to "optimize" their motion, in a way that is most 145 convenient to them, when faced with an access control point. In an on-line supplement to this 146 paper, at http://vision.fe.uni-lj.si/research/hof/articles/prl09jp/, we present video mosaics of 147 people entering one of the access points as part of their daily routine.
148
These assumptions allowed us to design a novel method for validating person identity and 149 detecting unusual human behavior at the automated access control points (ACP), based on the 150 descriptors, derived from the histograms of optical flow.
151
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: first, we will describe the algorithm for comparing Our method is based on extracting motion features from image sequences using optical flow.
157
The distinct advantage of such approach is that the burden of correctly estimating motion in 158 variable lighting conditions and clutter is entirely confined to optical flow calculation. There are 159 many approaches to calculate the optical flow, and as we show in the experimental section, at 160 least two approaches can be used in our framework. 
169
Algorithm 1 : Obtaining HOF descriptors of motion of a person. Input: Optical flow sequence F (k), definition of n image sub-regions, temporal reference point t r Output: HOF descriptor -n sequences of symbols S i b (k) and S i a (k), i ∈ [1, n] describing the motion before and after t r .
1: Perform temporal smoothing of flow field with the temporal median window spanning each triplet of sequential flow images
Discard the vectors outside of the predefined region of interest (containing person).
3: Split the sequence F (k) at the temporal reference point t r (e.g. key card registration), to the sequences F b , containing flow before the reference point and F a , containing the flow after the reference point:
4: Initialize 2n empty sequences of symbols, n sequences corresponding to the activity before the reference point (S 1 b . . . S n b ) and n sequences corresponding to the activity after the reference point (S 1 a . . . S n a ).
Divide the flow field into n sub-regions F i , as shown in Figure 1 b).
7:
for Each sub-region i, i ∈ [1, n] do 8: 
9:
Find the bin with maximum count in the 2-dimensional histogram, argmax
Generate symbol s vθ , based on a bin with maximum count.
11:
Add s vθ to the sub-region symbol sequence, either
end for 13: end for 14: for All sequences
Remove symbol repetitions in the sequence.
16: end for
The algorithm basically calculates the dominant motion in each of the sub-regions. Both the 170 amplitude and direction of motion are quantized through the use of 2D optical flow histograms,
171
and therefore the dominant motion can be encoded simply by assigning a symbol to each of the built. We call the sets of such symbol sequences HOF descriptors. In a real world implementation,
174
the descriptors can be extracted from the flow sequences immediately after the flow is obtained,
175
therefore reducing the need for storage of original video sequences or optical flow field sequences.
176
As described in the next section, this dictionary-based representation of motion can be extremely 177 compact, and is therefore ideally suited for embedded devices.
178
Observing the maximum in each histogram is inherently noisy approach, however, due to small 179 number of bins, the effects of noise are small. Likewise, the lowest-velocity bin is discarded to 180 get rid of the low-velocity noise, which inevitably appears in optical flow vectors.
181
In our case, normalized Levenshtein distance in conjunction with nearest-neighbor classifica- pre-entry behavior and the entry itself.
194
Algorithm 2 : Comparing two HOF motion descriptors in our experiments. Input: Two sets of HOF descriptor sequences S α and S β , each containing 2n sequences of symbols, describing the motion in n sub-regions before and after a temporal reference point.
Output: Normalized distance D(S α , S β ) between the descriptors
Calculate the Levenshtein distances L i b and L i a between the corresponding symbol sequences:
Obtain normalized distances Ln i b and Ln i a by dividing each distance with the length of the longer of the two compared sequences. (a) (b) was as follows: approaching the door, presenting the keycard to the keycard reader, waiting for 201 audible confirmation (beep), placing finger on the fingerprint scanner, waiting for audible "click"
202
of the electronic lock, pulling the door, and finally, entering.
203
Typical view of the person from each of the cameras is shown in Fig. 3 . were aware that the recordings are taking place.
228
After the database of videos at ACP 1 has been collected, the videos were visually inspected 229 to evaluate the uniqueness and permanence of motion and activity. We observed that people open to return without authentication).
236
Acknowledging this, videos from ACP 1 were categorized both according to subject identity 
240
To further test our approach, ACP 2 was built, and near real-time implementation was tested.
241
At ACP 2, four people were asked to perform complete authentication routine (keycard, finger-242 print, entering door) many times. They were asked to perform the required tasks in a way that 243 seemed most convenient for each one of them. While people were entering ACP 1 as part of their 244 daily routine, the tests at ACP 2 were done on several separate occasions, with many entries 245 performed on the same day.
246
During the online tests at ACP 2, the on-line performance of a presented approach was mea-247 sured. However, while speed of execution was within our expectations, the classification rate was 
Implementation details 254
Tests of the proposed approach were done in two phases. 
264
The contents of the lowest amplitude bins (between 0 and 0.33) were discarded, as they contain Multiple experiments have been performed on the acquired data. The task of the described 288 prototype system would be to recognize imposters (e.g. persons with stolen or borrowed keycard) 289 and, additionally, to detect unusual behavior (e.g. tailgating). To streamline the analysis, HOF 290 descriptors for all videos, acquired on both ACP 1 and ACP 2 were precalculated using the 291 methods described above.
292
The positions of the cameras at ACP 1 and ACP 2 were significantly different, and the sensor 293 setup (keycard sensor and fingerprint scanner) differed significantly as well. There was also only 294 a slight overlap between the persons entering at ACP 1 and those participating in tests at ACP 295 2 (one person common to both groups). Therefore, the analysis for ACP 1 and ACP 2 was 296 performed separately.
297
The videos from ACP 1 have been processed using dense optical flow, while videos from ACP 298 2 have been processed using MPEG4 motion vectors in place of optical flow. HOF descriptors,
299
obtained as described in the first part of Algorithm 2, were compared to all other descriptors.
300
The normalized distance d N was observed to assess descriptor performance. 
306
The results are shown in Table 1 . Observing the confusion matrix in Table 1 Confusion matrix for all clips from the database of ACP1. The word after the slash (/) denotes the activity. "plain" denotes the usual mode of authentication -without carrying any objects. "notebook" means that person was carrying a laptop computer, and "bags" means that person was carrying extra luggage. Numbers denote the number of matches between each of the clips in the categories in the first column and categories in the first row. Again, observing the confusion matrices, it can be seen that HOF descriptors perform well in 330 such setup -numbers on the diagonals are the largest in each row. Success rates for intra-group 331 tests on groups A and B were 91% and 89%, respectively. Success rates for comparison of Group
332
A to Group B and vice-versa were 95% and 85%.
333 Table 2 Confusion matrix for intra-group test of Group A from ACP2. All experiments so far were based on pure nearest-neighbor principle. In practice, as number 334 of users would rise, such a system would be faced both with people which are unknown (have no 335 Table 3 Confusion matrix for intra-group test of Group B from ACP2. 
Person

Discussion
363
We presented Histograms of Optical Flow (HOFs), which were used to compactly describe 364 human motion from sequences. We have shown that HOF descriptors can be used to recognize or 365 verify the identity of the persons in the context of video surveillance, coupled with access control.
366
We have also shown that HOF descriptors can be used to detect unusual and unwanted behaviour, 367 such as entrance of multiple persons using a single keycard -a scenario called "tailgating". There is only one category of false negatives, since it is impossible to determine why certain sample was rejected, other than it was simply too different from the samples from the training set.
The tests have shown that, using currently available off-the-shelf equipment, the results can be for descriptor extraction as well (it does contain motion that is related to person opening the 376 door and entering), and therefore, as presented, cannot be used for realtime decision on whether 377 to grant or deny access to a person currently being identified.
378
In theory, our method of extracting HOF descriptors is computationally expensive, however 
388
One drawback of our method is requirement for independent temporal reference. We observe 389 motion that is, in effect, "normalized" (all persons have to perform same task), and the temporal 390 reference (in our case, the moment when keycard is recognized by the access control system) 391 is used to align the sequences, before descriptors are extracted. As we have witnessed in our 392 experiments, even small errors in temporal alignment (e.g. a few frames) can have devastating 393 effect on the recognition rate.
394
The method can be easily extended to multi-camera setup. Images are divided into segments 395 that are processed separately almost all the way, and only at the end the results are combined 396 in a final distance between sequences. Algorithm itself does not assume any spatial correlation 397 between image segments, therefore, they could as well come from different cameras.
398
As presented, our method is not well suited to provide hard decisions to allow or disallow entry 399 of a certain person. However, such system can decide in near realtime on whether the entry of a 400 person was suspicious or not (either due to wrong identity or other behavioral anomalies), and 401 that information can be used in many ways that are beneficial for the overall security of the 402 protected area. For example, it could be used for alerting the security staff or flagging the log 403 entries for a subsequent or periodic manual security review of the video archive, dramatically 404 improving the efficiency of such undertaking. In that context, it could be used as an automated 405 video database indexing tool.
406
Although we developed and tested our methodology in the framework of an access control point 407 scenario, we believe that the method has potential for a wider use, especially in situations where 408 people are expected to perform certain tasks, and the deviation from their tasks is sufficient 409 reason for alarm. Most of those scenarios involve people interacting with machines in one or 410 another way, which also provides opportunity for obtaining above mentioned temporal reference. 
